PRAISE (& SURPRISE) FOR THE "ZOMBIE RUNNER"...

 IT's not popular...

After all, no one is thrilled with the notion of "walking with a zombie."

BUT the designated runner rule that baseball implemented in 2020 has the backing of insiders, and isn't going away. 

It bothers purists and analysts alike, because it chips away at the game's laissez-faire underpinnings (on one hand) while (apparently) undermining the home-field advantage (on the other). 

And a majority of "analytic pundits" dislike it because it encourages one-run strategies, specifically the sacrifice bunt.

THUS the pejorative nickname--which is a shame, because baseball's Lords actually managed to create something tantalizing and strategic when they put this rule into play.

We will need a lot more data to accumulate before we will know everything about the impact of the "zombie runner." There are nuances in how the rule plays out that can't be quantified properly until we have at least 50,000 plate appearances in hand for extra-inning games played under its aegis. (Which part of the batting order is involved in the tenth inning is a variable that needs measurement--and that data doesn't seem to have been collected yet...and, sorry, but we aren't going to do it. Perhaps we can cajole the folks at Forman et soeur to do so at some point--but don't hold your breath.)

BUT we can measure a surprising trend in the general won-loss records of teams in 2025 who are employing the "lubricant" of the one-run strategy--the sacrifice bunt. 

At the All-Star break (roughly 60% of the way through the 2025 season), we find that 13 teams have made a sizable increase in their usage of the sacrifice bunt during extra innings (as measured by the statistic sacrifice hits per 100 PA, or SH/100).

As the chart (at left) shows, a comparison of the extra-inning won-loss records in 2025 for these 13 teams shows that their WPCT in such games has improved in excess of 100 points over their won-loss record in extra-inning games in the previous five seasons (2020-24).

The 13 teams in question had a .474 WPCT (369-409) in extra-inning games from 2020-24. Thus far in 2025, that WPCT has jumped to .579 (70-51).

Of course there could be random factors that are influencing these results, so we'll have to wait for (at least) the season's end to state with greater confidence that one-run strategies are having a greater impact on extra-inning success. But the fact that the teams employing the sacrifice bunt can be found across the game's quality spectrum is an encouraging sign.

Three of the 13 teams who've increased their use of the SH in extra-innings are under-performing their 2020-24 WPCT--the White Sox, the Mets and the Mariners. But, conversely, that means that upwards of 75% of the teams who've significantly increased their use of the SH in extra-innings games are doing better in such games.

WE don' t know if that margin of difference (.579 this year as opposed to .474 in the previous five seasons) will hold up, but its mere existence is a surprising (and pleasing) occurrence.

It leads to a more reckless, anti-purist impulse on our part: a possible limited expansion of the "zombie runner" rule to cut down a bit further on the number of pitchers appearing in a game and to introduce another strategic component into the game. Are you ready? Here goes:

--Beginning in the top of the eighth inning, whenever the game is tied at that point, the visiting team can call for the employment of the "zombie runner" for the balance of the game.  

Data indicates that about 13% of all games are tied going into the top of the eighth, so we will suggest that visiting managers be permitted to call for the "zombie runner" up to twelve times in a season.

Given that run scoring increases in innings where the "zombie runner" appears, the expansion of the strategy into earlier innings should cause a further decrease in extra-inning games. 

(Under this rule, the visiting team can also wait until the ninth inning and implement then--some of that will depend, of course, on which batters are available for which innings.)

IT's another strategic wrinkle that can add tension to games that are already as close as a game can get score-wise.

Would it become more popular this way? Hard to say--but we could go for it.  Of course, YMMV...

CAN WE GET "SLOPPY JOE" TO SHUT UP ABOUT SHUTOUTS?

IN two words: probably not. The one thing we know about Joe the P. is that when he gets the bit in his teeth, he will run with it for as long as he can.

It's true that shutouts are up thus far in 2025. And this is creating consternation in some quarters--specifically, that semi-elite niche of "veteran punditry" that fashions itself as a bulwark of "cutting-edge minutiae" that is all-too-often over-represented as being of oracular significance.

Such obsessive territoriality, as practiced with overly-energetic gusto by Joe (and, in a less egregious vein by Jayson Stark, avuncular avatar of the "it's never happened before, folks!" beat) is mostly a way to generate what we all have taken to calling ''content" (but with a diminishing sense of just how useful it actually is).

"Hold the pickle, Joe!"

SO how are these two handling the uptick in shutouts we mentioned? They are following an approach that has created an ongoing malaise in statistical analysis in the festering world of "baseball numberology" (and, yes, in case you were wondering, we are once again being sponsored by our long-time buddies at frightquotesrus.com). 

What is that malaise, exactly? It's the use of a counting stat to characterize a situation when a rate stat is actually needed to create proper historical context.

Joe the P. has, as a result, turned into one of his most maddening alter-egos--"Sloppy Joe"--as he milks this story even more shamelessly than we did ten years ago when we documented the diminuendo of the complete game. (Thankfully, that particular diminuendo got so dim that we could abandon it entirely...)

Now it's true that we might see the highest number of shutouts in history this season. (Also, the greatest number of 1-0 games--a subset that Joe has staked a claim to by following in the dubious "naming rights" approach pioneered by Bill James.) For Joe, such games are now called "Blylevens"--even though Walter Johnson actually participated in many more of them. That's the curly-Q approach that epitomizes the appropriative hubris of ''popular sabermetrics"--a brazen breeziness that dovetails into the clickbait world with a special brand of odious precision (but, as it turns out, is sloppy as hell).

Jayson Stark at least recognizes a nuance that has been left in the crockpot by Sloppy Joe: namely, that not all counting stats are equal. The 82 1-0 games in 1968 (and, yes, we're sticking with the term "1-0 game"...) occurred over a season span with about a thousand less games in a season than is the case now. That tells us that 82 such games in 2025 are a proportionately smaller percentage of total games played than was the case in 1968.

The same is true for shutouts in general. The 204 that we've seen thus far in 2025 represent 7.8% of all games; the 1-0 games are about 17.5% of all shutouts. We can generate such rate stats for these categories for all of the seasons in baseball history, and by doing so we can see where those rate stats reside in the data set. (Sloppy Joe could have done the same thing, of course, but the counting stat is what creates clickbait.)

WE can even do something that looks like actual analysis--and here is an example of that: a correlation between the percentage of shutouts in a season with the average runs per game (R/G) in the corresponding year.

Sloppy Joe suggested that the rate of shutouts in 2025 was at an all-time high: the diamond marker shown in red (OK, actually orange, the lighting is a bit dim in here, folks!)--the percentage of 7.8% mentioned above--gives the lie to such a claim. While that percentage is above the historical average for shutouts per total games (which is 6.5%), it is not close to the highest such yearly percentage in baseball history--a record set in 1908 (11.9%).

NOTE the diamond marker colored in yellow: that's the data point for 1968--the season of eternal trauma for those invested in defending the sabermetrics-to-analytics klatch from the nagging criticism that this twenty-year process has deformed the game on the field as it evolved into a runaway juggernaut. Any time anything starts to remotely look like what occurred in 1968, a barely-suppressed sense of hysteria starts to well up in these folk, who then start picking at the scab of the never-quite-healing wound that has continued to problematize the game for the past twenty years.

But let's look at that "red diamond" again, noting that it sits almost exactly in the center of our scatterplot. Is it both intriguing and harrowing that baseball is currently centered in its range of historical distribution with respect to R/G? Our expectations for run scoring have still not quite adjusted from what took place during the long "offensive explosion" (1993-2009), and the ping-pong effect that we saw during the initial phase of the "launch angle era" (2015-2021) seems to be subsiding into an ungainly phase of pitcher domination (as we predicted would be the case back in 2012). 

That red diamond (4.37 R/G, 7.8% ShO), representing 2025, shares one nearly identical data point with the previous year (4.39 R/G), but note that shutouts were a good bit lower in 2024 (6.6%). What the scatterplot suggests is that there is a random effect that comes into play in the middle ranges of R/G:  the distribution of such games can simply vary. While there is a generally linear correlation between R/G and ShO%, it is neither absolute nor monolithic in nature.

(And before we move on--what about that black diamond at the bottom of the scatterplot--representing the second-lowest percentage of shutouts in a season? What year is that, anyway? It's 1930...)

WE can see the variation at work more starkly (no pun intended...) when we look at how 1-0 games fluctuate as a subset of shutouts. The red diamond again represents 2025 (to date), with 18.6% of all shutouts being 1-0 games. That's merely above average relative to the historical average (17.5%). The pale green diamond represents 1968, where nearly a fourth of all shutouts were 1-0 games. The black diamond represents the ultimate extreme instance of this--30.4%--which happened in (that's right) 1908.

BUT this scatterplot also reveals another reason for the undercurrent of panic in Sloppy Joe's presentation of the counting stats. While this data has fluctuated up-and-down across time, the general direction it has moved is downward, a pattern that is particularly pronounced beginning in the late 1970s. Note also that the numbers have clustered at an all-time low for 1-0 games relative to shutouts in recent years. (Some of that might be traceable to the HR/G spikes we had in alternating seasons from 2017-21.)

We can see that clustering in the ''most/least" table (at right), which shows that four of the top ten years for the lowest percentage of 1-0 shutouts have occurred since 2017, with 2024 being the third lowest percentage in all of baseball history.

It's that pervasive recent decline in 1-0 games that has been turned around (thus far) in 2025, about a 40% jump from 2024. But 2025 doesn't have anything close to the highest rate of 1-0 games in history: in fact, it doesn't even have the highest rate in the 21st century (that belongs to 2014). 

AND it's really that sudden, unexpected uptick that has kerfuffled the feathers of Sloppy Joe, who's apparently decided he only knows from counting stats and erroneously inflated the situation by using those counting stats to overdramatize what is (at least partially) a random effect.

Others who've picked up on this in the media (that particular grapevine is thick and well-tended...) have asked for some kind of explanation as to why this is happening. But their attempts to do so (bad teams bloating the totals, the apparent deadening of the ball) did not bear fruit. The likely answers are: a) some of it is truly just a random effect; b) the continuing emphasis on hitting homers has created a strategic vacuum where teams in 1-0 games remain stubbornly reluctant to employ one-run strategies due to the lingering effect of the "launch angle hegemony," which causes extra games to fall into the 1-0 bracket. (Interestingly, though it's a small sample size, it appears that teams do attempt to steal at elevated levels in such games--but the success rate for SBs is lower than average.)

The situation is not without some interest, but Joe is employing sloppy methods to exaggerate its significance. While having him bound and gagged is tempting (especially as the Orange Menace goons attempt to normalize suppressive tactics ahead of an even more unseemly power grab...), we think there's at least some chance that this will self-regulate.

MOST important, though, is the maxim that a rate stat is more useful than a counting stat. Sloppy Joe needs to hold that thought instead of "holding the pickle"...

INTERLEAGUE STANDINGS AS OF 6/30/25

ONE of the oddest things about baseball in the 2020s is the simultaneous expansion of interleague play and the disappearance of data anatomizing the results of those games. We'll eventually reconstruct that data in total here (as time permits), but it is rather vexing to note that this subset of competition (now comprising almost a third of the overall schedule) continues to be given such short shrift. 

A key aspect of this will be evident in the interim 2025 results (shown below). The old model of interleague play was circumscribed in a way that did not create a random effect in the seasonal results--the games were played in monolithic chunks within the season. The new model creates a perpetually uneven distribution across the entire season. This will be evident in the data...

WE organized the data by league/division to show this randomness that insinuates itself even at the most granular level. For example: note that the NL West (near the bottom of the display) shows a massive range between the number of interleague games played by team in the division.

It's also important to capture the differences in distribution of games according to opponent quality, an area that has been almost completely ignored by fans, media, and analysts ever since the inception of interleague play. Our tripartite column structure summarizes individual team results by opponent quality (.500+, .499-, and overall) to show how opponent quality factors into this subset of game results.

IT shows a number of interesting things, of course--and you are invited to explore it all at your leisure. One of these that its noteworthy, however, can be seen in the interleague record of the San Diego Padres when broken out in this way. Among NL teams, the Padres have faced the most "good" opponents in the AL, and (as Jeff Angus would say if he were here...) have had their asses handed to them--a visual image that can be saved from pornographic associations only by substituting "donkeys" for "asses". Their current 3-15 record against good AL teams contributes mightily to the distance they find themselves behind the Los Angeles Dodgers (a nine-and-a-half game difference, which as of this writing constitutes the entire difference in the standing between the two clubs).

We leave you to examine this data in your own way, but let's close with a note about the uneven distribution of opponent quality between the leagues. So far AL teams have played far more games against good NL teams than vice-versa. They are playing better against such opponents than their NL counterparts have done against good AL teams (.458 WPCT to the NL's .423). But the distributions we see in the summary data at the bottom shows that there is a randomness skewing how these games are affecting the overall standings.

In the second half of the year there will be a great preponderance of AL teams playing bad NL opponents...what to watch for is a possible, even quite likely shift in the overall interleague results (bottom right of the figure) where the NL currently holds a slight advantage (184-180).

WE will revisit this data at the end of August to see if such is the case. Stay tuned...